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Summary
The authors’ goal with this paper is to give insight into the complex world of European 
Union’s State aid and public procurement rules which have an ever-increasing importan-
ce in EU law, in the EU, and consequently, in Croatia as well. The paper will first explain 
the four conditions that have to be cumulatively fulfilled in order for a certain measure to 
constitute an illegal State aid and after that, the authors will give an overview of the most 
relevant rules and conditions of the public procurement procedures. In their elaboration 
the authors will cover the EU State aid and public procurement rules from the perspective 
of: a) the primary legislation of the EU, that is, the Treaties; b) the secondary legislation; 
c) case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union; d) European Commission’s 
documents and e) current academic legal reasoning. Moreover, the authors will pass their 
own judgement and give their opinion on the relevant rules and issues of EU State aid and 
public procurement rules. 
Key words: State aid, public procurement, state resources, thresholds, restricted pro-
cedure.
1. Introduction
It is February 2016, and the European Commission has updated its State Aid Score-
board, from which it is visible that in the year 2014, 28 Members States (hereinafter: MS) 
have spent 101,2 billion euro, that is, 0.72% of EU’s BDP on State aids in sectors such as 
agriculture, services, fishery, etc.1 To put things in perspective, one should note that the EU 
spends 1.55% of BDP on defence which is an essential function of every state or in this 
case union.2 Judging by the numbers, one can conclude that MSs’ governments think that 
giving away State aids is also an essential function of the State. This trend seems to be on 
the rise, because in the year 2014 there was around 33 billion euro more spent on State 
1 European Commission, ‘State aid Control’, <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/register/>, accessed 19 
February 2016; Index, ‘Zemlje EU na državne potpore u 2014. potrošile 101 miljardu eura’, <http://www.index.hr/
novac/clanak/zemlje-eu-na-drzavne-potpore-u-2014-potrosile-101-milijardu-eura/87562 9.aspx>, accessed 20 
February 2016.
2 The World Bank, ‘Military expenditure (% of GDP)’, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND. GD.ZS/
countries/EU?display=graph>, accessed 21 February 2016
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aids than in the last year.3 According to the European Commission, such an increase re-
flects MSs’ increased awareness, following adoption of the 2014 Energy and Environmen-
tal Aid Guidelines,4 that renewable energy support involves State aid.5
After the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference, held in Paris, France, in 
December 2015, it is fair to say that the European Union will continue to stimulate MS 
to give State aids to eco-friendly projects. As a result, State aid and public procurement 
procedures will be more and more used for ecological purposes. The authors are suppor-
tive to every effort which leads to saving our world’s climate. But, on the other hand, the 
authors also believe that valuable State aid and public procurement rules should not be 
violated because of the lack of knowledge and/or under the disguise of giving eco-friendly 
State aids within or outside of the public procurement procedure.
So, the question is - why are the EU State aid and public procurement rules valuable 
to the EU project and why is their study (in general and in this paper) and respect needed? 
It might come as a surprise that public procurement rules (which are about how public 
authorities spend public money when buying goods, works or services) are a valuable tool 
for the EU in achieving its ecological and other goals. But these rules have a significant 
financial impact because they range from buying IT equipment or providing water, gas and 
electricity to building a hospital or a road. The Directive 2014/24/EU of 26 February 2014 
on public procurement6 and the Directive 2014/25/EU of 26 February 2014 on procurement 
by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors7 play a key 
role in the ‘Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’, as one of the 
market-based instruments to be used to achieve smart, sustainable and inclusive growth 
while ensuring the most efficient use of public funds.8 They were enacted in order to incre-
ase the efficiency of public spending, facilitating in particular the participation of small 
and medium-sized enterprises (hereinafter: SMEs) in public procurement and to enable 
procurers to make better use of public procurement in support of common societal goals.9
How effective public procurement rules may be in fulfilling the urgent needs of the EU? 
Public procurement affects a substantial share of world trade flows, amounting to € 1000 
billion per year; it makes up a significant part of national economies: 10-25% of gross do-
mestic product (hereinafter: GDP).10 In the EU, the public purchase of goods and services 
3 European Commission, ‘State aid Control’, ibid; Index, ‘Zemlje EU na državne potpore u 2014. potrošile 101 
miljardu eura’, ibid.
4 See more: Communication from the Commission, ‘Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and 
energy 2014-2020’, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52014XC0628(01)>, ac-
cessed 22 February 2016
5 European Commission, ‘Daily News 17/02/2016’, <http://europa.eu/rapid/midday-express-17-02-2016.htm>, 
accessed 23 February 2016
6 Directive 2014/24/EU.
7 Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by 
entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC 
Text with EEA relevance 2014 OJ L 94/243. The paper will concentrate more on the General Directive 2014/24/
EU, than on the Utilities Directive 2014/25/EU due to the general nature of Directive 2014/24/EU and because 
the differences between the General and the Utilities Directive are not important for the purpose of this paper.
8 Paragraph 4 of the Recital to the Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors 
and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC Text with EEA relevance 2014 OJ L 94/243 (Directive 2014/25/EU).
9 Paragraph 4 of the Recital to the Directive 2014/25/EU; there is also a need to clarify basic notions and concepts 
to ensure better legal certainty and to incorporate certain aspects of related well-established case-law of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union. 196 Paragraph 17 of the Recital to the Directive 2014/25/EU 
10 See more: European Commission, ‘Public Procurement’ <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/
public-procurement/> accessed 24 March 2015.
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has been estimated to account for 16% of GDP.11 For instance, in Croatia the public pur-
chase of goods and services accounts for about 40 billion Croatian kuna per year, which is 
almost a third of the State’s budget.12 As one Commission official put it: ‘you aren’t buying 
pencils’.13 Since the State is buying with the public purse, it should always aim to achieve 
the best value for money and, at the same time, it should foster social justice and the 
protection of the environment. 
The original rationale for imposing EU oversight on State aid was to prevent countries 
from deliberately using State aid to benefit their own enterprises at the expense of rivals 
located in other Member States.14 If a country subsidizes national producers of goods for 
which there is international trade, similar subsidizes may be granted in retaliation by other 
countries, which in turn creates an escalation in the level of subsidies and ignites a poten-
tially wasteful subsidy race.15 Moreover, State aid may distort the dynamics of the compe-
titive process; aid may help perpetuate failed business models; it may reduce the incentive 
to compete; and may create moral hazard by encouraging excessive risk taking.16 These 
effects are likely to be even more serious and long-lasting than the mere distortions of 
the level playing field. In particular, moral hazard is a key concern. An implicit promise of 
the future aid may affect firms’ incentives by protecting them from the adverse consequ-
ences of their risk-taking thereby fostering overly risky behaviour.17 Repeated State aid 
may eventually create the expectation that certain undertakings are ‘too big to fail’ (or too 
politically important to fail), and thus perpetuate overly risky or inefficient business practi-
ce.18 Therefore, State aid rules are valuable for the European Union, so any environmental, 
societal or any other gain should not be offset by a loss of jeopardizing the goals of State 
aid rules. Hence, the authors will demonstrate the most important parts of the current 
legislation and the case-law regarding State aid and public procurement.
2. State aid
State aid is defined as an advantage in any form whatsoever conferred on a selective 
basis to undertakings by national public authorities.19 More precisely, article 107(1) of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter: TFEU) states:
Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or thro-
ugh State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort com-
petition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so 
far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.
In order to define a measure as State aid, it is necessary to cumulatively fulfil the 
following conditions:20
11 ibid
12 HRT vijesti, ‘Zamjerka javnoj nabavi: Nije najjeftinije uvijek najbolje’ (HRT, 17 March 2015) <http://vijesti.hrt.
hr/276643/tvrtke-imaju-zamjerki-na-sustav-javne-nabave-ponajvise-na-kriterij-najnize-cijene-23> accessed 25 
March 2015.
13 Dylan M Hughes, ‘The Inter relationship between the European State Aid and Public Procurement Rules: When 
does a government contractor gain an ‘economic advantage’?’ (2009) EIPA 1, 5.





19 Paul Craig, Grainee de Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (5th edn Oxford University Press 2011) 1088
20 Although, ‘The jurisprudence of the European Court has not yet provided a consistent and comprehensive in-
terpretation of the conditions for State aid (...)’ Kelyn Bacon, European Union Law of State Aid (2nd edn, Oxford 
University Press 2013) 20.
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(a) intervention by the State or through State resources,21 
(b) the recipient has an advantage22 on a selective basis;23
(c) the measure must distort or threaten to distort competition and;24
(d) be likely to affect trade between Member States.25
In the following sections, each of these conditions is going to be considered in details.
2.1. State resources and imputability to the State 
Even though it is not explicitly stated in the Article 107(1) TFEU, in the case Preusse-
nElektra the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter: the Court) clarified that 
no matter if the aid is granted directly by the State, or indirectly through State resources, 
measure must always be imputable to the State in order to constitute State aid.26  The 
authors point out that this is a great example how the Court goes directly contrary to the 
wording of the Treaties in order to achieve other valuable goals. The authors agree with the 
Court that in order to constitute State aid, the measure should be both imputable to the 
State and it should have an effect on State resources. But at the same time, the authors 
believe that it is absurd that in (EU) law ‘or’ means ‘and’, so there should be less similar 
examples in the future of such judicial activism because it goes directly against the wor-
ding of the Treaties.
2.1.1. State resources
Formulation ‘(...) aid granted by a Member State or through State resources’ within Ar-
ticle 107(1) is very broad, so there is first the notion of ‘Member State’ which includes both 
central, regional and local bodies, whatever their legal status and description may be,27 
and the notion ‘State resources’ which refers to any institution or body from the public 
sector.28 As a consequence of such a broad definition of ‘Member States’ and their ‘State 
resources’, State aid rules have a broad impact.
It is important to add that the characteristic of funds which can be source of aid is that 
they are constantly under public control, and therefore available to the competent national 
authorities for their disposal.29 Otherwise, the condition ‘imputability to the State’ cannot 
be fulfilled.
On the other hand, EU resources - and by that EU funding - do not constitute State 
resources until they come under the control of a Member State.30
21 Case 379/98 PreussenElektra EU:C:2001:160, para 58.
22 As some form of economic advantage, see case 39/94 SFEI and Others EU:C:1996:285, para 60; 280/00 Altmark 
EU:C:2003:415, para 83-4.
23 Case 200/97 Ecotrade EU:C:1998:579, para 40; 106-107/09 Commission v Gibraltar EU:C:2011:732, para 74.
24 Case 248/84 Germany v Commission EU:C:1987:437, para 18.
25 Case 372/97 Italy v Commission EU:C:2004:234, para 44; 148/04 Unicredito Italiano EU:C:2005:774, para 55.
26 In the PreussenElektra case electricity distributors had to buy annually a certain amount of electricity from 
‘green’ sources, the Court eventually ruled out State aid. See more for procedures which appear before the 
Court of Justice of the European Union: Koen, Lenaerts; Ignace, Maselis; Kathleen, Gutman, EU Procedural 
Law, (1st edn, OUP 2014).
27 Case 248/84 Germany v Commission EU:C:1987:437, para 17.
28 ‘In applying article 92 regard must primarily be had to the effects of the aid on the undertakings or producers 
favoured and not the status of the institutions entrusted with the distribution and administration of the aid .’ Case 
78/76 Steinike und Weinling v Germany EU:1977:52, para 21.
29 Case 83/98 France v Ladbroke Racing and Commission EU:C:2000:248, para 50.
30 Decision in Case N156/2006 South Yorkshire digital region broadband project (22 November 2006) para 29; 
Decision in Case SA.34056 Cable Car for London (27 June 2012) para 40.
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2.1.2. Direct and indirect effects 
It can be concluded from the previous chapter that the above distinction serves to 
bring within the definition both aids granted directly by the States and ones granted indi-
rectly, by public or private bodies established by the State.31 Common ground is that the 
aid must have a budgetary consequence for the State, meaning it must entail a financial 
burden for the State.32 The paper will specify certain forms of measures which have been 
found to constitute State aid in the interest of making it clear that the burden on State 
resources does not need to be actual, immediate or material.
The most straightforward type of measure that would constitute direct grant would be 
a subsidy or other positive transfer such as capital investment and injections,33 loans on 
preferential interest terms,34 interest-free loans,35 etc., while indirect financial measure can 
be waiver of public debts,36 or the informal tolerance of persistent non-payment of taxes, 
charges and other debts,37 etc. Payments for public services,38 different environmental 
obligations,39 and various tax related exemptions, reductions or special regimes have un-
der certain circumstances been found by the Court of Justice of the EU to constitute grant 
of aid.40 It is important to mention that State guarantees are to be considered as indirect 
aids, including implied guarantees, when they enable its recipient to obtain more favoura-
ble credit terms than what it would have obtained on its own merits alone and therefore, 
ease the pressure on its budget and therefore strengthening its financial position.41 It is a 
common belief that such State aid rules are useful to MSs which have an excuse not to 
have a toxic guarantee for public undertakings for which they are sometimes forced by 
their political motivations. The authors believe that it might be also good for the underta-
kings not to receive State aid, because they will be forced to ‘sink or swim’, earlier rather 
than later. Otherwise, without the strict EU State aid rules, the undertakings would be de-
pendent on aid from MSs which would have a complete discretion on choosing the timing 
and the amount of aid.
31 Leigh Hancher, Tom Ottervanger, Piet Jan Slot, E.C. State Aids (2 edn, Sweet and Maxwell 1999) 26.
32 Financial burden can be in the form either of expenditure or of reduced revenue; Case 82/77 Openbaar Ministerie 
v Van Tiggele EU:C:1977:205, Opinion of Advocate General (hereinafter: AG) Capotorti, pg 52.
33 Case 323/82 Intermills v Commission EU:C:1984:345; 305/89 Italy v Commission (‘Alfa Romeo’) EU:C:1991:142.
34 Case 57/86 Greece v Commisssion EU:C:1988:284; 15/98 and 105/99 Italian Republic and Sardegna Lines v 
Commission EU:C:2000:570.
35 Case 214/95 Vlaamse Gewest v Commission EU:T:1998:77.
36 Case 200/97 Ecotrade EU:C:1998:579, para 43.
37 Case 480/98 Spain v Commission (‘Magefesa’) EU:C:2000:559; 36/99 Lenzing EU:T:2004:312.
38 Case 280/00 Altmark EU:C:2003:415.
39 E.g. Case 279/08 Commission v Netherlands EU:C:2011:551; Decision 2007/580/EC Slovenian green electicity 
scheme [2007] OJ L219/9, paras 66-74.
40 E.g. Case 387/92 Banco Exterior de Espana EU:C:1994:100; 346-348/99 Diputacion Foral de Alva v Commission 
EU:T:2002:259; 81/10 France Telecom v Commission EU:C:2011:811.
41 Case 154/10 France v Commission EU:T:2012:452. An example of a guarantee and how it can confer an advan-
tage can be seen in the Bouygues case. The facts of that case are the following: ‘In December 2001, France 
Télécom was in great financial difficulties. It experienced share price losses and a downgrading of its credit 
rating. On 12 July 2002, the French minister for economic affairs made the following statement: ‘The State 
shareholder will behave like a prudent investor and would take appropriate steps if France Télécom were to face 
any difficulties … I repeat, if France Télécom were to face any financing problems, which is not the case today, 
the State would take whatever decisions were necessary to overcome them.’ This statement prevented France 
Télécom’s rating from being downgraded to junk status. Rating agencies quoted the statement of the French 
authorities and this was decisive for their decision to maintain an investment rating for the company. As a con-
sequence, the price for France Télécom shares soared.’ See more: European Commission ‘State aid: Commi-
ssion welcomes Court judgment on French State intervention in France Télécom’ (Press release, 19 March 2013) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-237_en.htm> accessed 3 March 2015.
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2.1.3. Imputability to the state
In determining whether a measure is imputable to the State, one must take into con-
sideration the context of the case which characterizes specific measures. This criterion 
is particularly important in order to establish the existence of State aid granted by public 
undertakings and where the State implements legislation adopted by the EU.42
Aid emanating from exercising legislative power is ‘necessarily imputable to the State’.43 
However, when the aid is granted by public or private bodies established or appointed by 
State to administer the aid the answer is often less clear cut. Some of the most important 
circumstances are the way in which the undertaking is established and its legal status 
(subject to public law or company law), its integration into the structures of the public 
administration and the degree of supervision and management of the body by the public 
authorities, i.e. its ability to make decisions without taking into account requirements of 
public authorities.44 
By contrast, a measure is not imputable to the State when it constitutes transposition 
or application of EU law, since the State has no discretion in the matter.45
By having the condition of ‘imputability to the State’, the scope of State aid rules is 
limited only to the distortions of competition produced from the Member States because 
the underlying logic is that Member States could be a too powerful economic operator 
on the market and by its dominant status they can produce a lot of negative effects with 
their aids. As a counter-argument to that logic the authors point out to undertakings such 
as Walmart (an American multinational retail corporation) which has bigger revenue than 
Norway, or Chevron (American multinational energy corporation) which has bigger revenue 
than the Czech Republic.46 The justification of limiting the prohibition of aid to Member 
States is debatable, but outside the topic of this paper.
2.2. Economic advantage and selectivity
To explain the second condition that a measure must fulfil to be characterized as State 
aid, the authors will first explain who is or can be recipient of the aid, second, what is con-
sidered as an economic advantage, and third, when is the aid given selectively. 
Article 107(1) refers to ‘undertakings’ as recipients, and in the sphere of competition 
law the concept of an undertaking covers every entity engaged in an economic activity, 
and any activity consisting in offering goods and services on a given market is an eco-
nomic activity.47 Status of an entity under national law or the way in which it is financed is 
of no importance, so no-profit-making entities can also be recognized as potential recipi-
42 Phedon Nicolaides, Mihalis Kekelekis, Maria Kleis, State Aid Policy in the European Community: Principles and 
Practice (2nd edn, Kluwer Law international 2008) 12.
43 Case 358/94 Air France v Commission EU:T:1996:194, para 59. See more : Conor Quigley, European State Aid 
Law and Policy (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2009) 13, 18.
44 Broader in Bacon (n 7) 69; the Court in the Case 78/76 Steinike und Weinling v Germany EU:1977:52 stated that 
in applying Article 92 (now 107) the focus should be on the effects of the aid granted to favoured undertakings 
or producers, not to the status of the institutions which granted it.
45 Conor Quigley, Anthony M Collins, EC State Aid Law and Policy (Hart publishing 2003) 17; case 351/02 Deutsche 
Bahn v Commission EU:T:2006:104, para 102.
46 ‘Corporations bigger than countries’ <http://www.businessinsider.com/25-corporations-bigger-tan-countries-
2011-6?op=1> accessed 22 April 2015.
47 Case Commission v Italy EU:C:1998:303, para 36.
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ents if they are on the market,48 as well as private undertakings and public undertakings.49 
Of particular importance are entities carrying out services of general economic interest 
(hereinafter: SGEI).50 To clarify key concepts of State aid in the field of SGEI, Commission 
adopted in 2011 a new instrument called Communication from the Commission on the 
application of the European Union State aid rules to compensation granted for the provi-
sion of services of general economic interest, known as SGEI Communication,51 in which 
it gives guidance on how to separate economic activity from the noneconomic ones for 
four areas: social security, health care, education and exercise of public powers. The latter 
concept captures activities that are States’ prerogatives, or are closely connected to them, 
for example army, police, air navigation safety and control, insofar as the State has not 
decided to introduce market mechanism in their organization.52 
An advantage that would fall within the scope of Article 107(1) must meet two con-
ditions: (a) it must lead to an improvement in the economic and/or financial position of 
the undertaking,53 and (b) such advantage would not have been received under ‘normal 
market conditions’.54
The relevant comparator for identifying ‘improvement’ constituting ‘advantage’ must 
be found by assessing the situation of competing undertakings in the Member State in 
question. Comparison of different Member States would be meaningless given the dispa-
rities between factual, legislative and economic situations in them.55 As regards the other 
condition, there is distinction between States’ role as a market participant and the one in 
which it exercises its sovereign or public functions. Relevant comparator for the first situ-
ation can be found in behaviour of the hypothetical private commercial actor, which is de-
termined by reference to ‘private investor and private creditor test’56 principle which tries 
to establish whether the advantage received by the undertaking could have been obtained 
from a market economy operator which seeks to obtain a normal return and profit. On the 
other hand, that principle must be excluded when State acts as a public authority because 
its conduct then cannot be compared to that of an operator in a market economy.57 Since 
an economic operator is guided by the profit, it would not invest in, for instance, museums 
if it’s not profitable, while in contrast the State, as a public authority, has a public interest 
beyond mere profit to invest in museums and culture. Therefore, these two distinct moti-
48 Case 222/04 Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze v Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze EU:C:2006:8 ‘the banking 
foundation must be regarded as an undertaking, in that it engages in an economic activity, notwithstanding the 
fact that the offer of goods or services is made without profit motive, since that offer will be in competition with 
that of profit-making operators.’, para 123.
49 Case 78/76 Steinike und Weinling v Germany EU:1977:52, para 18; ‘Public undertakings are defined as any un-
dertaking over which the public authorities may exercise directly or indirectly a dominant influence by virtue of 
their ownership of it, their financial participation therein, or the rules which govern it.’ Quigley, Collins (n 32) 24.
50 ‘Services of general economic interest (SGEI) are economic activities that public authorities identify as being of 
particular importance to citizens and that would not be supplied (or would be supplied under different condi-
tions) if there were no public intervention. Examples are transport networks, postal services and social services.’ 
Available at European Commission website <www.ec.europa.eu /competition/state_aid/overview/public_ser-
vices_en.html> accessed 30 March 2015.
51 Communication from the Commission on the application of the European Union State aid rules to compensation 
granted for the provision of services of general economic interest, OJ C8, 11.01.2012, p. 4-14.
52 Nicola Pesaresi and others, The SGEI Communication <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/
cpn/2012_1_10_en.pdf> acessed 15 April 2015.
53 Joined cases 399 and 401/10 Bouygues and Bouygues Telecom v Commission EU:C:2013:175.
54 Case 39/94 SFEI and Others EU:C:1996:285, para 60; 267-279/08 Region Nord-Pas-de-Calais v Commission 
EU:T:2011:209, para 158.
55 Bacon (n 7) 33.
56 For broader discussion about different considerations, functions and aims between private investor and private 
creditor test see Bacon (n 7) 39-47.
57 Case 196/04 Ryanair v Commission EU:T:2008:585, paras 84-5.
48 The EU State aid and public procurement rules
vations for investment should not be mixed and when the State acts as a public authority 
the private investor and private creditor test should not be applied.
Lastly, when the aid is given solely to an individual undertaking it is obviously selecti-
ve, but this criterion serves in occasions when measure applies more broadly to multiple 
undertakings,58 ‘to distinguish those schemes that are regarded as State aid from mea-
sures whose differential impact is not caught by Article 107(1)’.59 Even if the measure con-
cerns a whole economic sector, like it was in the Unicredito Italiano case with the Italian 
banking sector, it could be selective in relation to other economic sectors.60
 In the Adria-Wien Pipeline judgement the Court stated that the test for selectivity 
consists of three steps: after identifying the objective of a certain measure a comparison 
between undertakings in a comparable legal and factual situation needs to be underta-
ken to see if the undertaking in question has been subject to differential treatment, and 
final step is to ascertain whether the measure is justified by the nature or general logic of 
the system.61 Some of the most common examples of justified measures are progressive 
rate of income or profit taxation, on the ground of redistributive aim pursued by the tax 
system,62 or lighter administrative and regulatory requirements on micro, small and medi-
um-sized enterprises.63
2.3. Distortion of competition
‘Where State aid exists competition within the common market will inevitably be diffe-
rent from what it would have been had market forces remained the decisive factor.’64 As 
explained in Article 107(1), when the aid distorts or threatens to distort competition, by 
that affecting trade between Member States, it will be incompatible with the internal mar-
ket. The condition of distorting competition will be presented in this subchapter, and the 
condition of affecting trade in the following subchapter.
The basic way to detect a distortion of competition is to examine whether the aid 
strengthens the position of an undertaking in relation to its competitors in intra-commu-
nity trade.65 However, in order to establish that, it is not obligatory to do the evaluation of 
the position of the undertaking’s competitors, nor is it necessary to establish existence 
of competing undertakings in the Member State in question, given that the measure may 
affect undertakings established in other States as well.66 In addition to that, no actual 
effects or proof of distortion have to be presented, since it is sufficient to show that the 
58 The Court has emphasized on multiple occasions that State aid may exist regardless of the high number of 
benefiting undertakings, or the diversity, size or importance of the sectors to which those undertakings belong. 
Similarly, aid may concern a whole economic sector and still be covered by Article 107(1) of the Treaty. See 75/97 
Maribel bis/ter EU:C:1999:311, para 32; 172/03 Heiser EU:C:2005:130, para 42.
59 Bacon (n 7) 70.
60 Case 66/02 Italy v Commission EU:C:2005:768, paras 95-98; 148/04 Unicredito Italiano EU:C:2005:774, paras 
45-49.
61 Andrea Biondi, State Aid Is Falling Down, Falling Down: An Analysis Of The Case-law On The Notion Of Aid, 50 
Common Market Law Review 1719.
62 Joined cases 92 and 103/00 Territorio Historico de Alva v Commission EU:T:2002:61, para 60.
63 ‘The category of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is made up of enterprises which employ 
fewer than 250 persons and which have an annual turnover not exceeding 50 million euro, and/or an annual bal-
ance sheet total not exceeding 43 million euro.’ Extract of Article 2 of the Annex of Recommendation 2003/361/
EC. See Case 200/97 Ecotrade EU:C:1998:579, Opinion of AG Fennelly Opinion para 26.
64 Hancher, Ottervanger, Slot (n 18) 36.
65 Case 730/79 Philip Morris v Commission EU:C:1980:209, para 11.
66 Case 72-73/91 Sloman Neptun EU:C:1992:130, Opinion of AG Darmon, Opinion para 61.
49Pravnik, 49, 1 (99), 2016
measure threatens to distort competition.67 But, ‘even if in certain cases the very circum-
stances in which aid is granted are sufficient (…) the Commission must at least set out 
those circumstances in the statement of reasons for its decision,’68 or it risks annulment of 
its decision.
2.4. An effect on trade between member states
When a measure strengthens the position of an undertaking in relation to its competi-
tors in intra-EU trade, it will affect trade between Member States. This condition will most 
probably be met where the undertaking is carrying on a cross-border activity,69 where the 
sector affected is characterized by a substantial level of trade between States or where 
the sector has been liberalized at EU level (financial services, energy...).70 But, even if the 
beneficiary undertaking is not involved in exporting its products or services, inter-State 
trade may still be affected, because domestic production may be maintained or increased 
thanks to aid granted, with the effect that the undertakings established in other Member 
States have less chance of exporting their products to the markets in the Member State 
granting the aid.71 Since the assessment of potential effects on trade is made on a priori 
characteristics of a measure, without the obligation to provide actual proof of effects, even 
if there is no actual trade between States at the time when the aid is granted, it is relevant 
to consider the foreseeable developments in EU trade.72 
After considerate struggle with the Court which insisted that even small amount of aid 
can distort competition and affect trade,73 to increase transparency and legal certainty, 
the Commission has established thresholds up to which it believes that aid will not affect 
trade or competition. Commission adopted series of de minimis Regulations for different 
sectors, and under the general de minimis Regulation,74 aid not exceeding a ceiling of EUR 
200,000 (EUR 100,000 for undertakings active in the road transport sector) is deemed not 
to affect trade between Member States.75 
67 Case 301/87 France v Commission EU:C:1990:67, para 33 ; This is important because of the Article 108 (3) TFEU 
saying that ‘The Commission shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any 
plans to grant or alter aid. If it considers that any such plan is not compatible with the internal market having 
regard to Article 107, it shall without delay initiate the procedure provided for in paragraph 2. The Member State 
concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until this procedure has resulted in a final decision.’ 
The analysis of the effects on competition and trade must be made on a priori characteristics of the aid, ir-
relevant of the actual little competitive effect of a measure introduced in breach of States obligation to notify it. 
Saved otherwise, Member States who would comply with their obligation would be in worse position, which is of 
course unacceptable; See Bacon (n 7) 82-3, case 204 and 270/97 EPAC v Commission EU:T:2000:148, para 85.
68 Joined cases 296 and 318/82 Kingdom of the Netherlands and Leeuwarder Papierwarenfabriek BV v Commissi-
on EU:C:1985:113, para 24.
69 Decision in case SA.33952 (2012/NN) – Germany, Climbing centres of Deutscher Alpenverein, para 62; 256/97 
aDMT EU:C:1999:332, para 29.
70 Case 66/02 Italy v Commission EU:C:2005:768, para 119.
71 Case 102/87 France v Commission EU:C:1988:391, para 19; 280/00 Altmark EU:C:2003:415, paras 77-8.
72 Joined cases 447 and 449/93 AITEC v Commission EU:T:1995:130, para 139.
73 Case 142/87 Belgium v Commission EU:C:1990:125, para 43.
74 Last one replacing the preceding ones is Commission Regulation (EU) No 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on 
the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid 
Text with EEA relevance [2013] OJ L 352/1.
75 European Union: European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document: Guide to the application of the 
European Union rules on state aid, public procurement and the internal market to services of general economic 
interest, and in particular to social services of general interest, 29 April 2013, SWD (2013) 53, available <http://
ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/new_guide_eu_rules_procurement_en.pdf> accessed 15 March 
2015.
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In contrast, measures designed to fund local services have been deemed not likely to 
affect trade – annual subsidies for maintaining local swimming pools,76 funding small local 
museums,77 allowances aiming at the creation of facilities for relatively small local public 
hospitals…78
It is worth to mention that even if all of the conditions for State aid are cumulatively 
fulfilled, it can still be compatible with the internal market if it falls within the scope of Ar-
ticle 107(2) and 107(3) TFEU.79 In that case, such an aid is legal and allowed under EU law.
3. Overview of public procurements
Public procurement as process where a MS buys a big number of goods, works and 
services can be a potential means of giving illegal State aid, as is evident in a number of 
cases.80 So when there is an infringement of public procurement rules, the problem could 
be even bigger, and that is the fact that not only there is an infringement of public procu-
rement rules, but that there also might be an infringement of EU State aid rules. Such a 
possibility is an additional reason why the authors stress out the need of having knowled-
ge of public procurement rules and its respect.
In this chapter, the principles of procurement that are governing the regulation through 
General and Utilities Directive will be mentioned. Then, the thresholds above which the 
directives are applicable on public contracts will be set out, following with the explanation 
of the notion of a contracting authority on one side and an economic operator on the other 
side. Basics of each of the public procurement procedures will be clarified, and at the end 
of the chapter there will be an elaboration of the specifications and the requirements that 
the contracting authorities are putting in different stages of the procurement procedure to 
define subject-matter of the contract.
3.1. Principles of public procurement
The main obligation of contracting authorities is to treat economic operators equally 
and without discrimination, acting in a transparent and proportionate manner. The design 
of the procurement cannot be made with the intention of excluding it from the scope of 
76 Commission Decision in case N258/2000 – Germany – Leisure Pool Dorsten [2001] OJ C172/16.
77 Commission Decision in Case N630/2003 – Italy – Local museums - Sardinia [2005] OJ C27/3.
78 Commission Decision in case N543/2001 – Ireland – Capital allowances for hospitals [2002] OJ C154/4.
79 Art 107(2) TFEU The following shall be compatible with the internal market: (a) aid having a social character, 
granted to individual consumers, provided that such aid is granted without discrimination related to the origin 
of the products concerned; (b) aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional oc-
currences; (c) aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany affected by the 
division of Germany, in so far as such aid is required in order to compensate for the economic disadvantages 
caused by that division. Five years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Council, acting on a 
proposal from the Commission, may adopt a decision repealing this point. Art 107(3) TFEU The following may 
be considered to be compatible with the internal market:(a) aid to promote the economic development of areas 
where the standard of living is abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment, and of the regions 
referred to in Article 349, in view of their structural, economic and social situation;(b) aid to promote the execu-
tion of an important project of common European interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy 
of a Member State; (c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic 
areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common inter-
est; (d) aid to promote culture and heritage conservation where such aid does not affect trading conditions and 
competition in the Union to an extent that is contrary to the common interest; (e) such other categories of aid as 
may be specified by decision of the Council on a proposal from the Commission.
80 For instance see: Case 280/00 Altmark EU:C:2003:415.
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General Directive or with the intention of artificially narrowing competition.81 Whilst more 
importance is given to social and environmental considerations, it is also stated that the 
Member States shall take appropriate measures to ensure that in the performance of 
public contracts economic operators comply with applicable obligations in the fields of 
environmental, social and labour law established by Union law, national law, collective 
agreements or by the international environmental, social and labour law provisions.82 
Contracts under certain financial thresholds are not captured by the Directive, so for 
them the general provisions of the TFEU are important, in particular the free movement 
of goods (Article 34), freedom of establishment (Article 49) and the freedom to provide 
services (Article 56), as well as the principles deriving therefrom, such as equal treatment, 
non-discrimination, mutual recognition, proportionality and transparency.83
3.2. Thresholds
Scope of the 2014/24 Directive is limited to the contracts whose estimated value is 
equal or above specified financial thresholds. There are two reasons why the Directives are 
not applicable if the value of the contract falls below them. First, because of the inevitable 
cost in applying formal tendering procedures, their application is justified only where the 
benefits are likely to be bigger than these costs, because of that there are different thres-
holds for different contracts such as a public works contracts, public supply and service 
contracts, etc; second, the thresholds identify contracts for which there is likely to be 
competition from firms operating across borders.84
Thresholds determined in Article 4 of the 2014/24 Directive are as follows:
(a) EUR 5 186 000 for public works contracts;
(b) EUR 134 000 for public supply and service contracts awarded by central go-
vernment authorities and design contests85 organised by such authorities;
(c) EUR 207 000 for public supply and service contracts awarded by sub-central con-
tracting authorities and design contests organised by such authorities;
(d) EUR 750 000 for public service contracts for social and other specific services.
3.3. Contracting authorites and economic operators
The aim of the definition of contracting authority from the 2014/24 Directive is to cap-
ture all entities that are at risk of giving preference to national tenderers or applicants,86 
81 Competition shall be considered to be artificially narrowed where the design of the procurement is made with 
the intention of unduly favouring or disadvantaging certain economic operators, Article 18 (1) of the Directive 
2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and 
repealing Directive 2004/18/EC Text with EEA relevance 2014 OJ L94/65 (hereinafter: Directive 2014/24/EU).
82 Article 18 (2) of the Directive 2014/24/EU 
83 For broad discussion about general provisions of the TFEU including those concerned with State aid, undertak-
ings with granted special rights and provisions prohibiting anti-competitive practices and a dominant market 
position, see Sue Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement: Regulation in the EU and UK, vol1 
(3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2014) paras 4-05 - 4-119.
84 Joined cases 147 and 148/06 SECAP and Santoroso v Comuni di Torino EU:C:2007:711 Opinion of AG Ruiz-
Jarabo Colomer, para 23; Arrowsmith (n 69)  paras 6-85.; see more for the significance of the threshold values: 
Simon Evers, Hjelmborg; Peter Stig jakobsen; Sune Troels, Poulsen, Public Procurement Law - the EU directive 
on public contracts, (1st edn, DJOF Publishing 2006) 137. 
85 ‘‘Design contests’ are those procedures which enable the contracting authority to acquire, mainly in the fields of 
town and country planning, architecture and engineering (…) a plan or design selected by a jury after being put 
out to competition with or without the award of prizes’, paragraph 21 of the Recital on the Directive 2014/24/EU
86 Case 44/96 Mannesmann Anlagenbau Austria AG and Others v Strohal Rotationsdruck GesmbH EU:C:1998:4, 
para 33; see more for the notion of the contracting authority: Christopher, Bovis, EU Public Procurement Law, 
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because of the possibility that they might be guided with considerations other than eco-
nomic ones. But these entities, although not formally part of the State, manipulate with 
public funds in pursuit of public interest, so it is necessary to ensure that they are acting 
as much as possible along the ‘value-for-money’ principle. 
There are three groups of entities mentioned in the Directive. The first are more tradi-
tional state entities, namely the State, regional and local authorities. The second group is 
widely designed to cover all entities which have some dependency on the State, named 
as ‘bodies governed by public law’. The latter ones need to have all of the following cha-
racteristics:
(a) they are established for the specific purpose of meeting needs in the general inter-
est, not having an industrial or commercial character;
(b) they have a legal personality; and
(c) they are financed, for the most part, by the State, regional or local authorities, or by 
other bodies governed by public law; or are subject to management supervision by those 
authorities or bodies; or have an administrative, managerial or supervisory board, more 
than half of whose members are appointed by the State, regional or local authorities, or by 
other bodies governed by public law.87
The third and final group consists of associations formed by one or more such authori-
ties or one or more such bodies governed by public law.88
On the other side of the procurement process, there are economic operators. They 
offer the execution of works, the supply of products or the provision of services on the 
market, and can be any natural or legal person or public entity or group of such persons 
and/or entities, including any temporary association of undertakings.89 They cannot be 
required by contracting authorities to have a specific legal form in order to submit a tender 
or a request to participate in case of the ‘closed’ procedure. But, contracting authorities 
may require groups of economic operators to assume a specific legal form once they have 
been awarded the contract, to the extent that such a change is necessary for the satis-
factory performance of the contract.90 Also, contracting authorities can impose certain 
criteria as requirements for participation, inasmuch as they are related and proportionate 
to the subject-matter of the contract. They are called criteria for qualitative selection and 
will be explained in the following subchapters.
3.4. Types of procedures
Contracting authorities must award public contracts by applying the national proce-
dures that are in conformity with the Directive.91 There are few types of procedures avail-
able in the Directive.
The ‘basic’ ones are open and restricted procedure. In open procedures, ‘any inter-
ested economic operator may submit a tender in response to a call for competition’92, and 
in the case of restricted procedures ‘any economic operator may submit a request to par-
ticipate (…) and only those economic operators invited to do so by the contracting author-
(2nd edn, Edward Elgar 2012) 286-333.
87 Article 2 (4) of the Directive 2014/24/EU, the Court in the case 373/00 Adolf Truley GmbH v Bestattung Wien 
GmbH EU:C:2003:110 stated that ‘Given the double objective of introducing competition and transparency, the 
concept of a body governed by public law must be interpreted as having a broad meaning.’ para 43.
88 Article 2 (1) of the Directive 2014/24/EU
89 Article 2 (10) of the Directive 2014/24/EU
90 Article 19 of the Directive 2014/24/EU
91 Article 26 (1) of the Directive 2014/24/EU
92 Article 27 of the Directive 2014/24/EU
53Pravnik, 49, 1 (99), 2016
ity following its assessment of the information provided may submit a tender.’93 According 
to Sue Arrowsmith, provisions of the aforementioned new Directive from 2014 need to be 
interpreted in a way that Member States cannot make any restrictions on when the two 
of these procedures (including other types of restricted procedure as well but with exclu-
sion of the negotiated procedure without prior publication) are going to be available within 
national systems, for example limiting some to certain procuring entities, or to existence 
of certain circumstances.94
Two other types that can be applied in limited number of situations are a competitive 
procedure with negotiation and a competitive dialogue. In a competitive procedure with 
negotiation, similar to restricted procedures, any economic operator may submit a request 
to participate in response to a call for competition, in which contracting authorities shall, 
inter alia, indicate minimum requirements to be met by all tenders. Likewise, only those 
economic operators invited by the contracting authority may submit an initial tender, and 
this is the difference from the restricted procedure, the basis for the subsequent negotia-
tions to improve its content.95 Slightly different, in the competitive dialogue, economic op-
erators who have been invited after submitting their requirements to participate enter into 
a dialogue with the contracting authorities with the aim to identify and define the means 
best suited for satisfying their needs. They can discuss all aspects of the procurement 
during this dialogue.96 These types of procedures can be chosen on limited grounds, for 
example, such as the one when the prior negotiations are crucial because of specific cir-
cumstances related to the nature, the complexity or the legal and financial make-up of the 
contract, or when the contracting authority cannot establish technical specifications with 
a sufficient precision.97 Further details of a competitive procedure with negotiations and a 
competitive dialogue, as well as the risks of wider availability of these procedures due to 
the 2014/24 Directive, shall be discussed in the third part of this thesis.
The novelty of the above-mentioned new Directive from 2014 is an innovation partner-
ship as a procedure possibility. When the contracting authority identifies that it cannot 
satisfy its needs with any of the existing solutions available at the market, it will set up 
innovative partnership with the aim to develop an innovative product, service or work and 
subsequently purchase the result. Submitting a request to participate is open to everyone, 
but only those economic operators invited by the contracting authority may submit re-
search and innovation projects which will be further negotiated.98 Possible traps hidden in 
innovative partnership, as a kind of public-private partnership and yet another possibility 
of restricted procedure, will also be examined in the third part of this thesis.
There is another type of a negotiated procedure, apart from the competitive procedure 
with negotiations. In a negotiated procedure without prior publication of a contract notice, 
contracting authorities do not have to advertise upcoming procurement process or hold 
any form of competition whatsoever, but may contact one (or more) providers. Naturally, 
because of that this procedure is permitted only in specific cases and circumstances, 
such as in cases of extreme urgency brought by unforeseeable events, further contracts 
with an existing provider, or where there is only one possible provider as in the case if the 
aim of the procurement is the creation or acquisition of a unique work of art.99 As men-
93 Article 28 (1) and (2) of the Directive 2014/24/EU
94 See  Arrowsmith (n 69) paras 7-07, 10-05.
95 Article 29 of the Directive 2014/24/EU
96 Article 30 of the Directive 2014/24/EU
97 Article 26 (4) of the Directive 2014/24/EU
98 Article 31 of the Directive 2014/24/EU
99 The grounds for its use differ for works, services and supply contracts. For work, services and supply contracts 
grounds are a) only one possible provider; b) extreme urgency; c) further contracts with an existing provider; d) 
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tioned at the beginning of this chapter, availability of this procedure, due to the wording 
of the Directive, differs from all of the other ones. Instead of using formulation as for the 
other types of procedures ‘Member States shall provide that contracting authorities may 
apply’, which has to be interpreted in a way that Member States cannot restrict usage of 
these procedures to certain situations or to certain entities, by saying ‘Member States may 
provide that contracting authorities may apply’ the Directive indicates that the State may 
decline availability of a procedure altogether or make it available only in certain circum-
stances or to certain entities.
3.5. Requirements of the contracting authority
In the last part of the overview of the basic public procurement rules, requirements 
set by the contracting authorities who determine the subject-matter of the contract and 
other requirements leading to the award of the procurement contract will be clarified. In 
more details they will be scrutinized in the third part of this thesis, examining how versatile 
they can be in acquiring aims ‘added’ to the procured work, service or supply in question, 
such as environmental or social aims, and how far they can go to maintain a link to the 
subject-matter.
Technical specifications are the ones which lay down ‘the characteristics of a public 
works contract, service or supply,’100 in that way depicting the subject-matter of the con-
tract and outlining the needs of a contracting authority. They can be set by referring to 
performance or functional requirements or by reference to technical specifications and 
various national, European and international standards.101
Parallel set of ‘introductory’ requirements, this time aimed at economic operators, is 
called criterion for qualitative selection. A criterion for qualitative selection has two possi-
bilities: a) it defines exclusion grounds and b) it is a selection criterion regarding economic 
and technical ability as requirements for participation. Exclusion of an economic operator 
from participation in a procurement procedure may be automatic as in the cases of partici-
pation in a criminal organisation, corruption or fraud,102 or subject to potential exclusion on 
request of the contracting authority or a Member State in case of bankruptcy, insolvency 
or grave professional misconduct.103 On the other hand, the requirements for participation 
need to ensure ‘that a candidate or tenderer has legal and financial capacities and the 
technical and professional abilities to perform the contract.’104
The first ‘competitive’ set of requirements is an array of award criteria. The base of 
the award criteria is the most economically advantageous tender. It is defined by various 
criteria each of which has different relative weighting, such as quality, aesthetic and func-
tional characteristics, accessibility, social, environmental and innovative characteristics, 
qualification and experience of staff assigned to performing the determined contract, etc. 
Taken all that in consideration, the most economically advantageous tender is determined 
using a cost-effectiveness approach.105
failure of prior open/restricted procedure. For supply contracts grounds are a) contracts for research, experi-
mentation, study or development; b) commodity purchases; c) purchases on advantageous terms. For services 
contracts exclusively ground is prior design contest, Article 32 of the Directive 2014/24/EU
100 Article 42 (1) of the Directive 2014/24/EU
101 Article 42 (3) of the Directive 2014/24/EU; see more for procedural requirements: Peter Trepte, Public Procure-
ment in the EU: A Practitioners’s Guide, (2nd edn, OUP 2007) 481-529.
102 For full and detailed list see Article 57 of the Directive 2014/24/EU
103 For a full and detailed list see Article 57 of the Directive 2014/24/EU
104 Article 58 of the Directive 2014/24/EU
105 Article 67 of the Directive 2014/24/EU; see more on the award procedures and criteria: Christopher Bovis, EC 
Public Procurement: Case Law and Regulation (1st edn, OUP 2006) 417-430.
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The final and additional requirements that may be laid down by a contracting authority 
are ‘special conditions relating to the performance of a contract.’106 They need to be linked 
to the subject-matter and addressed in the call for competition or in the procurement 
documents.107 Those conditions comprise economic, social, employment-related, environ-
mental or innovation-related considerations.
4. Conclusion
The authors’ goal with this paper was to give insight into the complex world of Europe-
an Union’s State aid and public procurement rules because State aid and public procure-
ment are being more and more used for EU’s ecological, social and economical goals. In 
conclusion, with an ever-growing usage of such procedures the authors believe that MSs 
need to be prudent in order not to violate the valuable rules of State aid and public pro-
curement. Otherwise, if MSs would disregard the EU legal system of State aid and public 
procurement and take the logic of Niccolò Machiavelli and say that ‘the goal justifies the 
means’,108 such an approach might be useful for broader EU’s goals, but, unfortunately, 
such logic would be flawed because the means are not justified.
106 Article 70 of the Directive 2014/24/EU
107 ‘Procurement document’ means any document produced or referred to by the contracting authority to describe 
or determine elements of the procurement or the procedure (…), technical specifications (…), information on 
generally applicable obligations and any additional documents’, paragraph 13 of the Recital on the Directive 
2014/24/EU
108 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince (Bantam Dell, New York 1996) 122.
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Pravila EU o državnim potporama i javnoj nabavi
Cilj autora ovog rada jest približiti kompleksni svijet pravila Europske unije na temu 
državnih potpora i javne nabave koja imaju rastuću važnost u europskom javnom pravu, 
u EU, kao i u Republici Hrvatskoj. U radu će se prvo obrazložiti četiri kumulativna uvjeta 
koja se moraju ispuniti kako bi se određena mjera smatrala nelegalnom državnom potpo-
rom. Nakon toga, autori će prezentirati najvažnija pravila, kriterije i uvjete procedure javne 
nabave. U razradi teme autori će obuhvatiti pravila EU na temu državnih potpora i javne 
nabave iz perspektive: a) primarnog zakonodavstva EU, tj., Ugovora EU; b) sekundarnog 
zakonodavstva; c) sudske prakse Suda pravde Europske unije; d) dokumenata Europske 
komisije i e) trenutačne akademske rasprave na tu temu. Nadalje, autori će izlagati vlastita 
mišljenja i stavove u odnosu na relevantna pravila i specifičnosti državnih potpora i javne 
nabave u EU.
Ključne riječi: državne potpore, javna nabava, državni resursi, pragovi, ograničeni po-
stupci.
